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The Civil Jury in America: Scenes from an
Unappreciated History
by
STEPHAN LANDSMAN*

The purpose of the jury trial in ...civil cases, [is] to assure a fair and
equitable resolution of factual issues ....I

I. Introduction
With these words the United States Supreme Court in 1973 began to
dismantle one of the structures integral to the Anglo-American civil justice process for more than 700 years-trial by a jury of twelve. Rather
than considering the rich and varied history or multiple functions served
by the jury, the Court focused on only a single aspect of the jury's work
as adjudicator. This constrained analysis of the jury's operations and
history has been employed all too frequently by both courts and jury
critics alike in interpreting the Seventh Amendment's mandate that "[iln
suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right to trial by jury shall be preserved."'2 This restricted
approach to juries is evident not only in functional analysis cases, like
Colgrove v. Battin,3 but also in proceedings in which the courts have employed a simplistic historical test that turns on whether a challenged jury
regulation was part of English common law practice in 1791.4 In both
* Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law. B.A. 1969, Kenyon College;
J.D. 1972, Harvard University. This Article is dedicated to the memory of Robert Hanley
(1924-1991), a lawyer who knew a thing or two about juries. It grew out of a piece entitled
The History and Objectives of the Civil Jury System prepared for the Brookings Institution and

the American Bar Association Litigation Section. The original work was presented at the
Symposium on the Future of the Civil Jury System in the United States held in Charlottesville,
Virginia, in June 1992. I wish to thank a number of colleagues and friends for their generous
assistance in reviewing earlier drafts of this piece, including Stephen Presser, Stephen Subrin,
and David Millon. I also wish to thank Brenda Johnson for her invaluable research assistance.
1. Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149, 157 (1973).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
3. See also Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412, 425-27 (1987) (Seventh Amendment
guarantees jury determination of liability, not civil penalties, in suit by the government under
the Clean Water Act).

4. There is ample historical justification for focusing on English common law practice in
[579]
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instances, this technique has removed the jury's historic flexibility and
multifaceted nature from the analysis. Ultimately, such an approach de5
preciates the jury's value and paves the way for ill-considered change.
The Court's objective in reducing the jury's complex history and
functioning to a simple tale is not clear. What seems likely, at least in
cases like Colgrove, is that the strategy has been used to marginalize the
jury, to render it less important and, therefore, more amenable to reform.
Such an approach is also tempting in the jury context because it simplifies the crafting of decisions by obviating the need to sort out the ambiguities of a history that has as many strands as there were original colonies
and as many interpretations as there were members of the committee
that drafted the Seventh Amendment. Yet, defining the jury's complexity and mutability out of existence prevents us from fully appreciating the
institution's past service, present value, and future potential.
The jury has been anything but a simple and unchanging icon of
courtroom procedure. Its most pronounced characteristic has been its
adaptability. The earliest jury served as an inquisitorial mechanism devoted to gathering data of the sort recorded in William the Conqueror's
Domesday Book. 6 Somewhat later it assumed the trappings of an executive agency enforcing myriad policies in the king's name, as well as adjudicating a broad range of disputes. 7 While the jury's association with
state authority and rule continued through the centuries, by the time of
the Stuarts' reign it had been transformed into a bulwark of liberty, a
means for citizens to resist excessive demands by government. 8
The American jury has also gone through a host of changes. In
early colonial times it was the essential instrument of governance, provid1791 when interpreting the scope of the Seventh Amendment. See infra text accompanying
note 122. This approach, however, has frequently led the courts both to ignore the dynamic
nature of the right to jury trial and to become preoccupied with the demonstrable presence or
absence of a challenged procedure at one specific moment in time. See Charles W. Wolfram,
The ConstitutionalHistory of the Seventh Amendment, 57 MINN. L. REV. 639, 744-45 (1973)
(discussing basis of static historical view). This tendency is illustrated in the Supreme Court's
ruling in Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 487 (1935) (constitutional provision for trial by jury
in effect adopted the rules of the common law as those rules existed in 1791). On the irrationality of this historical methodology, see Paul D. Carrington, The Seventh Amendment: Some
Bicentennial Reflections, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 33, 74-75.
5. Many scholars believe this is precisely what happened when the twelve-member jury
was abandoned. They contend that the jury has become less representative and more unpredictable. See Richard Lempert, Uncovering "Nondiscernible" Differences: EmpiricalResearch
and the Jury-Size Cases, 73 MIcH. L. REV. 644, 698-99 (1975); Hans Zeisel,. .. And Then
There Were None: The Diminutionof the FederalJury, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 710, 715-20 (1971).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 19-22.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 22-28.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 53-68.
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ing one of the few experiences common to virtually every citizen. 9 The
conflicts that led to the American Revolution transformed the jury into a
forum in which the colonists could express their concerns about judicial
independence and democratic government. 10 Later, during the republic's
formative period, the jury came to be viewed as necessary to counterbalance an invigorated judiciary.I
As the country matured during the course of the nineteenth century,
jury power steadily ebbed. In this time of judicial ascendancy, the jury
anchored the law to a greater measure of sympathy for the injured than
was desired by judges bent on doctrinal rigor, especially with respect to
tort law.1 2 While the expansion of judicial power in the 1800s resulted in
a narrowing of the reach of jury decisions, the jury emerged from this
period as a vital institution whose control over a range of issues--especially in tort litigation-had, if anything, been enhanced.
Despite its reinvigoration, in the early twentieth century the jury
3
was subjected to some of the sharpest criticism in its long history.1 Its
opponents challenged its composition, its procedures, and its very right
to exist. These criticisms eventually inspired a series of pathbreaking empirical studies that ultimately enhanced the jury's reputation.
The American civil jury has arrived in the late twentieth century in
remarkable condition. It is the entity to which society has assigned a
host of vital tasks, including the assessment of business morality, the protection of the consuming public, and the definition of a number of constitutional rights. However, it has also become the target of reformers who
have succeeded in both reducing its size and altering its rules of decision,
and who appear to be seeking its removal from all "complex" cases.
This Article will survey the historical progress of the jury. Piecing
together an outline of the jury's story has not been an easy task. In recent times, few scholars have devoted their attention to the history of the
jury. In particular, there has been little primary source research, especially with respect to what American juries have actually done and said
over the last 300 years. The bits and pieces strung together here have
been culled from the works of writers preoccupied with questions such as
the early development of the judiciary, 14 the birth and growing pains of
9.

See infra text accompanying notes 75-85.

10. See infra text accompanying notes 91-95.
11.
12.

See infra text accompanying notes 117-142.
See infra Part III.

13.

See infra Part IV.

14. See, eg., STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE AMERICAN AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE (1991) [hereinafter PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING].
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American legal doctrine, I5 the transformation of tort law in the nine7
teenth century, 16 and modem social science's analysis of jury behavior.'
The present discussion of the jury only scratches the surface and, because
of the meager sources available, must be considered extremely tentative
in its conclusions.
II.

The Rise of the Civil Jury

The right to trial by jury ... [is] not of the very essence of a scheme of
ordered liberty. ' 8
A. The English Background
Justice Cardozo's assertion in Palko notwithstanding, the history of
the rise of the jury in both England and America has been inextricably
intertwined with the creation and defense of fundamental rights. This
Part will explore the complex story of the jury's growth and, in particular, the jury's association with claims of liberty.
The jury's origins are a matter of substantial scholarly uncertainty.
Orthodox opinion, strengthened by the writings of great legal scholars
such as Maitland I9 and Thayer, 20 has held that the jury was a Norman
import, brought to England by William the Conqueror and his minions
after their victory at Hastings in 1066. More recent scholarly work by
Dawson 2 ' and others has shifted attention to the Anglo-Saxon antecedents of Norman jury procedure. Modem scholars have argued persuasively that important precursors to the jury existed in England prior to
the Conquest and likely played a significant part in inducing Englishmen
to place their trust in the jury trial mechanisms proffered by the
conquerors.
Accounts of the early history of the jury indicate that the Normans
pressed a rudimentary form of jury procedure into service to help them
secure an administrative hold on the lands they had seized by force of
arms. These early "juries" were bodies of citizens summoned by royal
15.

See, e.g.,

WILLIAM

E.

NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW:

THE

IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830 (1975).

16.

See, e.g., Wex S. Malone, The Formative Era of Contributory Negligence, 41 ILL. L.

REV. 151 (1946).

17.
18.

See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1971).
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
19.
1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 74 (Lawyer's Literary Club, 2d ed. 1959) (1895).
20. JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON
LAW 50 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1898).
21. JOHN P. DAWSON, A HISTORY OF LAY JUDGES 118-20 (1960).
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command to testify about property arrangements, local customs, and taxable resources in each neighborhood of the realm. One product of this
testimony was the Domesday Book recorded in 1085-86. Another was
the establishment of a more efficient governmental infrastructure in England than existed elsewhere in Europe. The historically noteworthy
characteristics of this early jury procedure include its reliance on the exercise of royal authority, its compulsion of jurors to participate in the
adjudicatory process, its utilization of the men of the neighborhood in a
corporate body to provide the information upon which to base decisions,
and its uniqueness as compared to traditional approaches that relied on
the actions of the litigants to settle disputes either by ordeal or combat. 22
These characteristics would remain important facets of the jury's operations for centuries.
The jury's primary function continued to be administrative until the
time of Henry II, who came to the English throne in 1154. By a series of
statutory enactments, known as assizes, Henry transformed the jury into
a genuine instrument of justice. 2 3 Pollock and Maitland suggest that
King Henry first used the jury trial to adjudicate the complaints of tenants who claimed to have been "disseised, that is dispossessed, of [their]
free tenement unjustly and without judgment. ' 24 The new remedy,
known as the assize of novel disseisin, offered claimants in such circumstances the opportunity to submit their case to a jury of at least arguably
knowledgeable local citizens rather than engage in trial by combat.
Novel disseisin was "fully organized" by 117925 and was an overwhelming success. It established a procedural pattern repeatedly copied over
the course of the next century to address different sorts of legal claims.
The reasons for its popularity were neatly summarized by the early treatise writer generally referred to as Glanvill:
The Grand Assize is a royal favor, granted to the people by one goodness of the King, with the advice of the nobles. It so well cares for the
life and condition of men that every one may keep his rightful freehold
and yet avoid the doubtful chance of the duel, and escape that last
penalty, an unexpected and untimely death, or, at least, the shame of
enduring infamy in uttering the hateful and shameful word ["Craven"]
which comes from the mouth of the conquered party with so much
22. Id. at 118-23; THAYER, supra note 20, at 54-57.
23. SIR PATRICK DEVLIN, TRIAL BY JURY 7 (1956).
24. 1 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 146. Professor S.F.C. Milsom has persuasively argued that the main purpose of this process in Henry II's time was "not replacing
seignorial jurisdiction but providing a sanction against its abuse." S.F.C. MILSOM, THE
LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 14 (1976). I am grateful to Professor David
Millon for bringing this point to my attention.
25. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 121.
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disgrace, as the consequence of his defeat. This institution springs
from the greatest equity. Justice, which, after delays many and long, is
scarcely ever found in the duel, is more easily and quickly reached by
this proceeding. The assize does not allow so many essoins 26 as the
duel; thus labor is saved and the expenses of the poor reduced. Moreover, by as much as the testimony of several credible witnesses outweighs in courts that of a single one, by so much is this process more
equitable than the duel. For while the duel goes upon the testimony of
one sworn person,
this institution requires the oaths of at least twelve
27
lawful men.

The jury grew for two reasons other than its administrative efficiency and popularity with litigants. In 1215, Pope Innocent III and the
Fourth Lateran Council prohibited ecclesiastical participation in trials by
combat and ordeal. This prohibition effectively undermined the existing
procedural alternatives to the jury and facilitated its rapid expansion.
Professor Dawson has argued that the jury's growth may also be traced
to the economic benefits it offered the Crown. 28 The adoption of jury
procedure placed most of the work of the judicial system in the hands of
unpaid local citizens. While a few professional judges were necessary to
supervise the process, most duties were undertaken by men who did not
have to be maintained at the king's expense. Thus, a great deal of judicial business could be handled inexpensively and, at the same time, substantial fees could be charged.
It has been suggested that in these early days jurors served primarily
as witnesses. 29 There is a good deal of evidence in twelfth and thirteenth
century practice to support such a contention. In William Forsyth's
1852 treatise on the jury, he recounted Glanvill's description of jurors as
being bound to report to the court their ignorance of the facts of the case.
In such situations, "others were chosen who were acquainted with the
facts in dispute."' 30 Such a procedure makes sense only when jurors are
the key source of information.
The method of reviewing jury verdicts and reversing their results in
these early days was known as attaint. 31 Professor Thayer found attaint
mentioned in cases as early as 1202.32 Attaint led to a rehearing of the
original evidence by a second, double-sized jury of presumably knowl26.
27.

Professor Dawson has defined essoins as "excuses for non-attendance." Id. at 295.
The passage from Glanvill is translated in THAYER, supra note 20, at 42 n. 1.

28.

DAWSON, supra note 21, at 293-94.

29.

See, e.g., THAYER, supra note 20, at 100.

30.

WILLIAM FORSYTH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY 105 (Burt Franklin ed., Lenox Hill

Pub. & Dist. Co. 1971) (1878).
31. For an excellent analysis of attaint, see David Millon, Positivism in the Historiography
of the Common Law, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 669, 684-700.
32. THAYER, supra note 20, at 143.
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edgeable local citizens. If the second jury concluded that the first had
erred, the verdict was overturned and the original jurors were condemned to severe punishment on the theory that they had committed
perjury. Such treatment could be justified only if the original jurors' failure involved their refusal to disclose a truth of which they were aware.
As Forsyth concluded: "Originally a wrong verdict almost necessarily
implied perjury in the jurors. They were witnesses who deposed to facts
within their own knowledge, about which there could hardly be the pos'33
sibility of error."

The treatment accorded subscribing witnesses in medieval times also
supports the witness-function hypothesis. Any and all subscribing witnesses were generally required to be produced when a deed or similar
document was at issue. These witnesses were then "combined" with the
jury that was to decide the case. 34 This amalgamation suggests a parity
of function consistent with the argument that all of the jurors were witnesses of one sort or another.
While subscribing witnesses presumably had information to impart
to the court, individual jurors were not necessarily well informed as to
the facts of the case. To increase the jurors' knowledge, procedures that
culminated in statutes enacted as late as 1427 required the sheriff to convey the jurors' names to the parties at least six days in advance of trial so
that the parties could "inform" the veniremen of pertinent facts. 35 By
the same token, adjudicatory procedures were arranged so that jurors
36
would feel at least some "duty" to investigate the questions to be tried.
All of these procedures served to press jurors into the witnessing role.
Yet the jury was never simply a collection of witnesses. Professor
Dawson has ably pointed out the weaknesses in the witness hypothesis.
He noted that while it was never expected that every juror would be an
eyewitness, the jury was always required to enter into a collective verdict,
representing the majority's opinion rather than simply delivering individual views of the evidence. 37 Eventually, English procedure cut the ties
that bound jurors to any sort of witnessing role. Perhaps the most signif33. FORSYTH, supra note 30, at 152.
34. THAYER, supra note 20, at 97-102.
35. Id. at 92.
36. 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 625.
37. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 123-25. In the criminal setting, a recent study has disclosed that medieval jurors were frequently drawn from a wide geographical area (a majority
living more than five miles from the scene of the crime) and hence, were unlikely to be true
witnesses. See Bernard W. McLane, JurorAttitudes toward Local Disorder: The Evidence of
the 1328 Lincolnshire TrailbastonProceedings,in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE 36-57 (J.S.
Cockburn & Thomas A. Green eds., 1988).
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icant step in this direction occurred in the mid-fourteenth century when
jury verdicts were required to be unanimous. 38 While unanimity might
seem a neutral proposition with respect to the juror-as-witness theory, a
deeper examination suggests otherwise. When jurors are genuine witnesses, there are likely to be disagreements among them, as is the case
with almost any group of a dozen observers. When jurors are compelled
to harmonize their views into one conclusive verdict, their individual witnessing functions inevitably must be subordinated to the group's need for
consensus.
Professor Dawson argues that unanimity was embraced by English
judges so that they could "divest themselves of any duty to assemble or
appraise the evidence. The fact-finding function was imposed instead on
groups of laymen, whose ignorance was disguised by a group verdict and
whose sources of knowledge the judges refused to examine."'39 It is not
clear why unanimity was adopted, but litigant acceptance of juror-driven
rather than judge-conducted factual inquiry was a likely cause. 4° In addition, the tremendous savings in time and money achieved by relying
exclusively on juries rather than a corps of inquiring magistrates to sift
through the evidence likely motivated this decision. 4'
The connection between witnessing and jury service was further
eroded as the juror knowledge requirement, the attaint procedure, and
the mixed juror-witness deliberation mechanisms were altered or abandoned. Knowledgeable jurors were hypothesized as a possibility as late
as 1670 when Chief Justice Vaughan made reference to them in Bushell's
Case.42 Modem historians generally agree, however, that Chief Justice
Vaughan was being purposefully anachronistic when he spoke.43 By
1682 it had become a punishable offense to contact or inform jurors of
any facts or law related to an impending trial. 44 Attaint died out as a
method of review no later than the early sixteenth century. In 1565 Sir
Thomas Smith, a widely quoted observer, noted that attaint was no
longer in use. 45 But perhaps the earliest of these mechanisms to yield
was the juror-witness mixed jury panel. Chief Justice Thorpe declared in
a 1349 case that:
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

DAWSON, supra note 21, at 125.
Id. at 126.
2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 19, at 620.
DAWSON, supra note 21, at 128, 293-95.
124 Eng. Rep. 1006-12 (C.P. 1670).

43. THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 242-45 (1985); John H.
Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REv.263, 285 (1978).
44.

LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY 70 (1973).

45.

THOMAS SMITH, DE REPUBLICA ANGLORUM 111 (Harper & Row 1972) (1583).
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[W]itnesses ... should say nothing but what they know as certain, ie.,

what they see and hear. If a witness is returned on the jury, he shall be
ousted. A challenge good as against a juryman is not good against a
witness. If the witnesses and the jury cannot agree upon one verdict,
that of the jury shall be taken, and the defeated party may have the
attaint against the jury .... 46
Thayer has suggested that by the mid-i 500s there was a complete separation of witnesses from the jury in almost all cases. 47
Perhaps as important as the decline of the jury's witnessing role was
the rise of in-court testimony as the basis for decision. While it may be
impossible to determine the precise moment that courtroom procedure
shifted to testimonial presentations in open court, such presentations
clearly came to dominate over the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries. 48 In De Laudibus Legum Anglie, written in 1471, Sir John
Fortescue described a judicial process that relied on the presentation of
witnesses in open court. It should be noted, however, that juror knowledge may have still played a part. 49 In Thomas Green's pathbreaking

research on the criminal jury, he noted the influx of a great flood of testimonial evidence by the middle of the sixteenth century.50 Statutes requiring the testimony of one or more witnesses began to appear during
the 1500s, making in-court inquiry essential in some cases.5 1 Throughout this era, barriers to live testimony, like charges of maintenance and
conspiracy, were, albeit slowly, being dismantled.5 2 The final movement
towards in-court testimony probably came in the mid-1600s when jurors
were isolated from outside influences and were required to decide cases
on the basis of what was presented in open court.
The early history of the English jury is remarkable not only because
of its constant adaptation to new and different needs, but also because of
its contribution to the establishment of certain fundamental principles of
democratic governance. These principles, and the jury itself, came to
play a critical part in the tumultuous events leading to the fall of the
46.

THAYER, supra note 20, at 101.

47. I7d. at 102.
48. For a careful analysis of how in-court testimony became a required part of courtroom
procedure, see John M. Mitnick, From Neighbor-Witness to Judge of Proofs: The Transformation of the English Civil Juror,32 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 201 (1988).
49. SIR JOHN FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE 58-63 (S.B. Chrimes ed.,

1942) (1471).
50. GREEN, supra note 43, at 105-52. For an argument focusing on the fifteenth century,
see Edward Powell, Jury Trialat Goal Delivery in the Late Middle Ages: The Midland Circuit,
1400-1429, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE, supra note 37, at 78.
51. THAYER, supra note 20, at 134-36.
52. Id. at 122-36.
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Stuarts, the rejection of absolute monarchy, and the rise of parliamentary
government.
From its earliest days, the British jury was called upon to perform a
wide range of tasks. Its administrative and adjudicatory activities made
it possible for the king to achieve a greater level of centralized control in
England than was possible anywhere else in Europe at the time. Yet as
Professor Dawson has indicated, relying on the jury and other lay decisionmakers such as justices of the peace had the unanticipated effect of
training "English society, through its local leadership, in the skills and
the practice of self-government. ' ' 53 Over the course of 600 years, English
jurymen learned to rule themselves. They developed traditions of independence from central bureaucratic authority. 54 These skills and attitudes did not spring up overnight, but were nurtured through centuries
of jury work. When the struggle for political liberty was joined in the
seventeenth century, Englishmen who had known and enjoyed self-governance were ready to fight for what they had come to perceive as their
rights.
The jury was also responsible for introducing the "middling sort,"
men of neither the aristocracy nor upper gentry but still of independent
means, to the responsibilities of governing. 55 Over time these citizens
would become the bedrock of English political democracy. As Stephen
Roberts explained, in the 1600s "the jury was the most representative
institution available to the English people."' 56 How this came about is
not hard to imagine. From very early in the jury's history, the wealthy
strove to avoid jury service and place others on the panels in their stead.
Statutes from the time of Edward I (1285 and 1293) point to the evasive
conduct of well-to-do potential jurors.5 7 Those who became the main53. DAWSON, supra note 21, at 134.
54. GREEN, supra note 43, at 105.
55. P.G. Lawson described the majority of seventeenth century jurors, at least in Hertfordshire, in the following way:
Those contemporaries who implied that the jurors were primarily men of the
"middling sort" were therefore closer to the mark than those who complained of men
of "meane estate." But even the former description is somewhat misleading. It is
correct insofar as it implies that most jurors stood between the gentry on the one
hand and the laborers and smallest property owners on the other, but it is incorrect
insofar as it implies that the jurors were, in economic terms, equally distant from the
two. The jurors were men of property; they were above that fundamental barrier
that separated those who owned property from those who did not.
P.G. Lawson, Lawless Juries? The Composition and Behavior of HertfordshireJuries, 15731624, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE, supra note 37, at 133 (citation omitted).
56. Stephen K. Roberts, Juries and the Middling Sort: Recruitment and Performanceat
Devon QuarterSessions, 1649-1670, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE, supra note 37, at 182.
57. Two statutes were aimed at correcting these abuses. One was 13 Edw. 1 (West 2) c.38
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stay of the jury system were men of modest property holdings.5 8 While
there were many complaints in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries
that such jurors were not "sufficient freeholders," it would appear that
the yeomanry "formed the social backbone" of the jury system.5 9 This
resulted in a significantly broader distribution of power through the upper economic strata of English society, and helps to explain the alarm of
those most highly placed in society.
The jury became even more important when the volume of litigation
soared in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A recent study of the
thousand-person village of Earls Colne found that more than 200 legal
actions were filed between 1589 and 1593. 0 In such litigious times, jurors played a critical role in regulating society. That the middling sort
were assigned this task bespeaks their access to real power and exposure
to the problems of governing. Blackstone aptly summarized the role that
the middling sort came to play:
[A] competent number of sensible and upright jurymen, chosen by
lot from among those of the middle rank, will be found the best investigators of truth and the surest guardians of public justice. For the most
powerful individual in the state will be cautious of committing any
flagrant invasion of another's right, when he knows that the fact of his
oppression must be examined and decided by twelve indifferent men,
not appointed till the hour of trial; and that, when once the fact is
ascertained, the law must of course redress it. This, therefore, preserves in the hands of the people that share which they ought to have
in the administration of public justice, and prevents
the encroachments
61
of the more powerful and wealthy citizens.
In the seventeenth century the Stuart kings increasingly sought to
intrude upon these and other traditional power arrangements. 62 The predictable response from juries was a rising tide of resistance. John Beattie,
one of the finest modem historians of seventeenth and eighteenth century
legal practice, has declared that "[t]he late seventeenth century was the
heroic age of the English jury, for in the political and constitutional
in 1285, which recited a practice of using poor, diseased, and decrepit men so as to spare the
rich. Also, St. of 21 Edw. I in 1293 recited similar troubles stemming from sparing the rich
when they were likely to know the facts of the case. THAYER, supra note 20, at 90.
58. Lawson, supra note 55, at 133; Roberts, supra note 56, at 212.
59. Lawson, supra note 55, at 133.
60. ALAN MACFARLANE, RECONSTRUCTING HISTORICAL COMMUNITIES 183 (1977).
61. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 683 (1978)
(Nourse Publishing Co., 1959) (1783).
62. GREEN, supra note 43, at 105-06.
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struggles of the reigns of Charles II and James II, trial by jury emerged
63
as the principle defense of English liberties."
One of the most important moments for the jury came in 1670 when
the Quakers William Penn and William Mead were prosecuted for
preaching in public. 64 A jury of twelve Londoners stood firm in their
acquittal of Penn and Mead despite strong judicial pressure. Upon entry
of the jury's verdict, the judge fined and jailed the jurors, including Edward Bushell. Bushell refused to pay his fine and brought a habeas
corpus proceeding challenging the legality of his incarceration. In a precedent-setting ruling65 Sir John Vaughan, Chief Justice of Common
Pleas, barred the jailing or fining of jurors except in cases of overtly corrupt behavior. Vaughan's ruling sharply curtailed judicial control over
the jury.
Alarmed by Bushell,66 the judiciary sought, especially in seditious
libel cases, to narrow the options available to jurors by tightly circumscribing the questions they were asked to decide. In 1688 these efforts
were undermined in the Seven Bishops Case when another courageous
London jury acquitted seven Anglican bishops of seditious libel for signing a letter that indicated their opposition to the reading of James II's
second Declaration of Indulgences in their churches. 67 The acquittal of
the bishops has been viewed as the true beginning of the Glorious
63. J. M. Beattie, London Juries in the 1690s, in TWELVE GOOD MEN AND TRUE, supra
note 37, at 214.
64. For a description of Penn and Mead's trial, see GREEN, supra note 43, at 221-36.
65. Id. at 236-49.
66. 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670).
67. Lord Thomas Gabington Macaulay described the production of the bishops' letter in
the following way:
On the eighteenth a meeting of prelates and of other eminent divines was held at
Lambeth.... After long deliberation, a petition embodying the general sense was
written by the Archbishop with his own hand. It was not drawn up with much
felicity of style. Indeed, the cumbrous and inelegant structure of the sentences
brought on Sancroft some raillery ....
But in substance nothing could be more
skilfully framed than this memorable document. All disloyalty, all intolerance, was
earnestly disclaimed. The King was assured that the Church still was, as she had
ever been, faithful to the throne. He was assured also that the Bishops would, in
proper place and time, as Lords of Parliament and members of the Upper House of
Convocation, show that they by no means wanted tenderness for the conscientious
scruples of Dissenters. But Parliament had, both in the late and in the present reign,
pronounced that the sovereign was not constitutionally competent to dispense with
statutes in matters ecclesiastical. The Declaration was therefore illegal; and the petitioners could not, in prudence, honour, or conscience, be parties to the solemn publishing of an illegal Declaration in the house of God ....
2 THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 153 (Lady Trevelyan ed., 1866) reprinted in STEPHEN B.
PRESSER & JAMIL S. ZAINALDIN, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 12 (2d
ed. 1989).
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Revolution and had the effect of catapulting the jury to popularity "as a
bulwark of liberty, [and] as a means of preventing oppression by the
Crown."' 68 Treatises extolling the jury flooded the market 69 and profoundly influenced eighteenth century American as well as English views
70
about jury trial.
The jury came to operate as a defender of rights in both the criminal
and civil settings. During the 1760s, a member of Parliament named
John Wilkes engaged in a series of radical political actions, including
publishing a broadsheet called the North Briton. In Number 45 of that
paper, Wilkes appeared to accuse King George III of lying about ongoing peace negotiations with France. Although Wilkes was quickly arrested and charged with seditious libel, the case against him was
dismissed on a technical point involving parliamentary privilege. Wilkes
immediately commenced a damages action for false arrest, trespass, and
theft of personal papers. The jury awarded him the extraordinary sum of
£1000 as damages against a number of officials including Lord Halifax,
the head of the government. 7 1 This decision's inclusion of substantial
punitive damages was remarkable because it is generally agreed to have
been the first occasion on which an avowedly punitive award was permitted. 72 The jury's power to award punitive damages in order to protect
the rights of citizens in civil cases was emphasized by Lord Chief Justice
Pratt, who declared that juries had authority
to give damages for more than the injury received. Damages are
designed not only as a satisfaction to the injured person, but likewise as
a punishment to the guilty, to deter from any such proceeding for the
future,73 and as a proof of the detestation of the jury to the action
itself.

Wilkes's case and his ongoing conflicts with the British administration were a matter of keen interest in the American colonies. In the early
1770s, South Carolina went so far as to provide Wilkes monetary support
for one of his political campaigns. 74 From the era of the Glorious
Revolution to the time of Wilkes's struggles, the jury was the very es68.

Austin W. Scott, Trialby Jury and the Reform of Civil Procedure, 31 HARV. L. REV.

669, 676 (1918).
69. Id. (citing The Englishman'sRight, The Guide to English Juries, and The Security of
Englishmen'sLives).

70. Id. at 676-78.
71. Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 499 (C.P. 1763).
72.

See MARK PETERSON ET AL., PUNITIVE DAMAGES:

EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

1-2

(1987).
73. Id.at 489-99.
74.

(1973).

JOHN CARSWELL, FROM REVOLUTION TO REVOLUTION: ENGLAND 1688-1777 141

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44

sence of liberty, a fundamentally democratic institution that served as a
check on the tyrannical and oppressive power of government.
B.

The American Reception

The jury came to America with the earliest settlers. The 1606 charter given by James I to the Virginia Company has been read as incorporating the right to jury trial. 75 By 1624 juries were available for all civil
and criminal cases in Virginia. 76 The Massachusetts Bay Colony followed a similar pattern by introducing jury trials in 1628 and codifying
jury procedure in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties in 1641 .77 The
Colony of West New Jersey followed suit in 1677, as did Pennsylvania
under William Penn's proprietorship in 1682. Eventually, all the colonies embraced trial by jury.
The jury played a critical role in early colonial history. Focusing on
developments in Massachusetts, William Nelson concluded that in pre78
revolutionary days the jury was the central instrument of governance.
Its wide-ranging activities starkly contrasted with the circumscribed operations of both the royal executive and colonial legislature. Massachusetts juries had responsibilities strikingly similar to those assigned to
juries in medieval England. They were the chief assessors of legal claims
and the primary enforcers of legal rights for their communities. According to Nelson, they maintained the economic and social stability of colonial society by enforcing rather strict codes concerning debt and
79
morality.
Nelson has argued that Massachusetts juries had vast authority and
independence in the colonial era because they, like their forebears in the
Glorious Revolution, had power over questions of law as well as fact.80
Their freedom appears to have been enhanced because trials were conducted before three judges, each of whom was free to state his divergent
view of the law in closing instructions, thereby providing the jurors with
several versions from which to choose. The jurors' critical assessment of
the law was further encouraged by counsel who were permitted to argue
legal questions in their closings. It is legitimate to surmise, as Nelson
75.

Harold M. Hyman & Catherine M. Tarrant, Aspects of American Trial Jury History,
(Rita J. Simon ed., 1975).
76. Id. at 25.
77. MASSACHUSETTS BODY OF LIBERTIES para. 29 (1641), reprintedin SOURCES OF OUR
LIBERTIES 151 (Richard L. Perry & John C. Cooper eds., 1952).
78. NELSON, supra note 15, at 13-23.
79. Id. at 45-47.
80. Id. at 3.
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has, that the jury had broad control over legal as well as factual issues
and was therefore the ultimate authority in the courtroom process.8 1
Despite the jury's broad authority, it did not exercise unlimited control over the adjudicatory process. A range of constraints operated to
rein in jury power. Among these were a set of evidentiary rules that
directed jurors to treat oath-supported testimony as binding,8 2 a social
consensus so strong and pervasive that it limited the jury's freedom of
action, a modest number of cases that were litigated, and a judiciary that
was comprised of locally prominent men8 3 capable of exerting significant
influence over their neighbors.8 4 In Massachusetts, it seems likely that
the judge and jury maintained a balance of power. Each prevented the
other from exercising arbitrary power or ignoring the needs of society.
The Massachusetts arrangement may not have been typical. In his
study of Virginia, A.G. Roeber concluded that lay justices of the peace
wielded the real power in the early days of that colony.8 5 Whatever the
situation in individual states, people throughout America were preoccupied with safeguarding the jury right, relying upon the jury to restrain
government. For example, in 1734 journalist John Peter Zenger was
charged with seditious libel for accusing William Cosby, the Governor of
New York, of corruption, misfeasance, and usurpation of the right to
jury trial. The case was tried to a jury instructed that it was obliged to
convict if the defendant had published the words in question, a matter
clearly established by the proof. Counsel for Zenger, however, argued
that the jury was free to reject the judge's instructions if it found that the
journalist's accusations against the Governor were true. The jury verdict
acquitting Zenger established that: the press should be free to criticize
the government, truth should be a defense to libel charges, judges do not
necessarily have absolute control over questions they designate as
"legal," and colonial juries, like their English counterparts, were fully
capable of defending fundamental rights.8 6 Even though Zenger was a
criminal case, its repercussions were felt in civil jury proceedings as well.
81. Id. at 28-30. For a similar analysis of the operation of American juries in general
during the eighteenth century, see SHANNON C. STIMSON, THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION IN
THE LAW: ANGLO-AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE BEFORE JOHN MARSHALL (1990).
82.

NELSON, supra note 15, at 25.

83. Id. at 33.
84. Nelson rejects this idea. Id. There is ample evidence, however, that seventeenth century English judges were extremely skillful at controlling juries. See J.S. COCKBURN, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH ASsizs: 1558-1714 122 (1972).
see
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When the jury right was threatened in the colonial era, citizen reaction was generally swift and hostile. This was the case in New York
when royal governors tried to expand the operation of the chancery
court, a court which operated without a juryA7 The most dramatic
clashes concerning this issue took place during the 1720s and 1730s between Governors William Burnet and William Cosby, on the one side,
and the New York legislature and the common law courts, on the other.
In 1727 the legislature passed a resolution condemning both Governor
Burnet and the chancery court. In the 1730s New York Chief Justice
Lewis Morris denied Governor Cosby's motion to hear a case concerning
his salary in a non-jury forum and the governor promptly dismissed the
Chief Justice from office.A8
Shortly after his dispute with Morris, Governor Cosby exercised his
powers as Chancellor of the Chancery Court to award a tract of land to
certain of his allies. Because of his actions in this so-called affair of the
"oblong tract," Cosby was publicly compared to Lord Chancellor Jeffreys who, during the last years of the Stuart monarchy, abused his equitable powers by undermining municipal charters that had guaranteed
parliamentary rights to a number of communities opposed to the king.8 9
When Governor Cosby died in 1736, the dispute cooled. However, the
threat of chancery trials without juries, especially in cases determining
the question of land title, were a source of continuing anxiety for New
Yorkers.
In the mid-1700s, jury caseloads across America appeared to soar.
Roeber reports that in Virginia between 1750 and 1774 jury trials underwent an explosive increase. Debt cases, which for decades had been resolved by summary judgment, were now vigorously fought. Juries in
these cases were increasingly likely to act sympathetically toward debtors.9 0 It would appear that juries were far less willing than they once had
been to enforce rigid rules regarding debt. Instead, juries became one of
POLITICAL TRIALS 21, 21-42 (Michael R. Belknap ed., 1981). It should be noted, however,
that other historians have argued that the Zenger case had very little impact until a later time.
See Introduction, JAMES ALEXANDER, A BRIEF NARRATIVE OF THE CASE AND TRIAL OF
JOHN PETER ZENGER PRINTER OF THE NEW YORK WEEKLY JOURNAL 30-35 (Stanley N.

Katz ed., 2d ed. 1972).
87. Stanley N. Katz, The Politics of Law in Colonial America: Controversies over Chancery Courts and Equity Law in the Eighteenth Century, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 257,
274-82 (Donald Fleming & Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
88. This dispute was one of the questions explored by Peter Zenger's newspaper.
Finkelman, supra note 86, at 25-26.
89. See G.W. KEETON, LORD CHANCELLOR JEFFREYS AND THE STUART CAUSE (1965).
90. See ROEBER, supra note 85, at 128.
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the agents of change helping to introduce new values into the law and
society.
In the 1760s the struggle over jury rights shifted to the admiralty
and vice-admiralty courts, which were non-jury courts used by British
royal officials in the enforcement of the Navigation Acts and other laws
designed to control colonial commerce. 9 1 While both courts usually
dealt with criminal matters such as smuggling and failure to pay customs
duties, both could, and did, deprive colonists of civil jury trials, especially
regarding the seizure of vessels and conversion of cargoes. 92 The denial
of jury trials was a strong irritant in relations between America and
Great Britain, featuring prominently in formal colonial complaints in the
1760s and 1770s. The Stamp Act Congress of 1765 specifically declared
that "trial by jury is the inherent and invaluable right of every British
subject in these colonies.1 93 The clear purpose of this declaration was to
challenge the denial of the right to jury trial pursuant to the provisions of
94
the Stamp Act.
Immediately before the Revolution, questions regarding the right to
jury trial and the responsibilities ofjurors took on heightened importance
for the colonists. In 1773 a dispute erupted between the British authorities and Massachusetts residents regarding the compensation of colonial
judges. 95 The British administration insisted that judicial salaries were
under its control even though these salaries had previously been regulated by the colonial legislature. The new arrangement created a clear
threat to judicial independence and led to a call for Massachusetts judges
to resign. Four justices refused royal salaries, but Chief Justice Peter
Oliver accepted. The legislature voted to impeach him, but this action
was thwarted by the British governor. When Chief Justice Oliver appeared to hear cases in circuit court, jurors around the colony refused to
take the oath of office from him or participate in cases over which he
presided. These jurors became spokesmen, articulating colonial resolve
with respect to judicial independence.
In the mid-1770s, the American colonists held a series of congresses
to protest the oppressive behavior of British authorities in enforcing the
so-called Intolerable Acts and similar measures. These congresses
trumpeted the right to trial by jury in both civil and criminal cases and
91.
92.
93.

Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 75, at 29.
Wolfram, supra note 4, at 654-55 n.47.

RESOLUTIONS OF THE STAMP ACT CONGRESS 1765, para. 7, reproducedin SOURCES
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94. Id. at 267.
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excoriated royal administrators for tampering with that right. Such was
the case during the meeting of the First Continental Congress in 1774.
In particular, its fifth resolve stated: "the respective colonies are entitled
to the common law of England, and more especially to the great and
inestimable privilege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of that law."' 96 This declaration was aimed at both a
series of acts that sought to remove certain categories of cases to England
for trial, and royal regulations that interfered with the selection of jurors
97
in Massachusetts.
The colonists' concern about jury trials was reiterated in the Second
Continental Congress's Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms, issued in July 1775, which specifically challenged Parliament's passage of statutes "extending the jurisdiction of courts of
admiralty and vice-admiralty beyond their ancient limits [and] . . .de-

priving... [the colonies] of the accustomed and inestimable privilege of
trial by jury, in cases affecting both life and property." 98 The work of the
congresses culminated in the Declaration of Independence on July 4,
1776. The Declaration listed the denial of "the benefits of trial by jury"
as one of the grievances that had led to the creation of the new nation. 99
In the period between the 1760s and the Revolution, the jury represented the most effective means available to secure the independence and
integrity of the judicial branch of the colonial government. Because of
the jury's power, the British authorities increasingly sought to either control or avoid jury adjudications. The struggle over jury rights was, in
reality, an important aspect of the fight for American independence and
served to help unite the colonies.
For obvious reasons, juries were exceedingly popular with the drafters of the revolutionary constitutions fashioned by the newly independent
states. Virginia set a pattern in 1776 by specifically including the right to
both civil and criminal jury trials in its Bill of Rights. The majority of
other states quickly followed suit: "The right to trial by jury was probably the only one universally secured by the first American state constitutions ..... 100 It has been hypothesized that a common allegiance to the

right to jury trial played an important part in drawing the new nation
96. DECLARATION AND RESOLVES OF THE FIRST CONTINENTAL
Res. 5, reproduced in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 77, at 288.
97. Id. at 281-82.
98.

CONGRESS,

DECLARATION OF THE CAUSES AND NECESSITY OF TAKING UP ARMS
OF OUR LIBERTIES, supra note 77, at 296.
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99.
100.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 19 (U.S. 1776).
Wolfram, supra note 4, at 655, (quoting LEONARD W. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRES-
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closer together.10 1 The right to a jury trial was appealing because of both
its association with the revolution and its fundamentally participatory
character.
In the early 1780s, democratic aspirations led Americans to fashion
state governments in which the legislative branches were preeminent and
the national government little more than a loose confederacy. These arrangements did not prove thoroughly satisfying: citizens began to feel
that insufficient protection was being accorded the right to property and
that anarchy might overwhelm the nation. This fear was heightened by a
series of provocative events that took place between 1784 and 1787. In
this period, both North Carolina and Rhode Island shamelessly manipulated their currencies to assist debtors: "[W]hen Rhode Island's supreme
court ruled in behalf of a creditor who refused to accept.., depreciated
paper [currency], the legislature censured the court and replaced the
judges."10 2 In Massachusetts, taxpayers began an open revolt against the
payment of the state's debts. Many Americans believed that this movement, which became known as Shays' Rebellion, threatened the very
03
foundation of order in New England.
This background may help to explain how the civil jury, which had
been the most popular vehicle of courtroom justice in the period leading
up to and including the Revolution, came to be ignored by the drafters of
the Constitution in 1787. The delegates who drafted a new plan of government were, for the most part, creditor-oriented' °4 nationalists. 10 5
They were deeply troubled by recent events in the country and were committed to creating a strong national government that would put an end to
the threat of anarchy. They spent most of their time and energy fashioning the executive and legislative branches of this new, stronger central
government.
Matters concerning the judiciary "ran a poor third as a focus of
interest,"' 0 6 and the civil jury was mentioned only twice, on September
101. Hyman & Tarrant, supra note 75, at 30.
102. FORREST McDONALD, Novus ORDO SECLORUM 156 (1985).
103. Whether Shays' Rebellion actually threatened the political and social integrity of
Massachusetts and surrounding states is a difficult question. McDonald argues that the rebellion's scope was greatly exaggerated by a number of contemporary observers, most particularly
Henry Knox, the Confederation's Superintendant of War. See id. at 176-78.
104. See Wolfram, supra note 4, at 677.
105. MCDONALD, supranote 102, at 185-88. But see Akhil R. Amar, The Bill ofRights As
a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1134-36 (1991) (emphasizing the "states rights tradition"
among the drafters of the Constitution).
106. Edith G. Henderson, The Backgroundof the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV.
289, 292 (1966).
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12 and 15, 1787.107 In these two brief discussions, the drafters decided to
refrain from including the civil jury in the text of the Constitution. The
civil jury was excluded because "[t]he Representatives of the people may
be safely trusted in this matter," 10 8 and a host of drafting problems made
inclusion of a civil jury guarantee impossible. 0 9 The Constitution, without any reference to the civil jury, was transmitted to the Continental
Congress on September 17, 1787.
While it is not likely that the drafters intended to eliminate the civil
jury from America's courts, the omission of the jury from the Constitution signalled a profound shift in the way an exceedingly powerful segment of society had come to view the institution. Most scholars have
concluded that claims about drafting difficulties were disingenuous. 0
Instead, there was a growing belief that the jury should play only a modest part in the governance of post-revolutionary America. Commentators have offered at least three justifications for the jury's declining
importance. First, because the British government no longer controlled
the judiciary, there was no need to insist on the presence of juries to
counterbalance judges biased in favor of England. Second, the Revolution had resulted in the installation of democratically elected legislatures.
Thus, the right to jury review or nullification of laws was less important
amidst legitimately established democratic laws. III Third, jury decisions
were bound to be ad hoc and, frequently, anti-creditor. If America's financial system was to be placed in order, it may have been necessary to
curtail jury action in favor of more predictable and consistent rulings
12
guaranteeing the rights of investors."
The omission of the civil jury triggered a firestorm of protest. In
response, the Federalists sought to assuage worries about the right to
civil jury trial. To this end, Alexander Hamilton wrote Number 83 of
The Federalist. He began by acknowledging the adverse reaction to the
exclusion of the civil jury right from the Constitution. He assured his
readers that its omission was not intended as an attempt to abolish jury
trials, and he went on to extol the jury's virtues in the following terms:
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if they agree
in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set upon the trial by
107.
108.

Id. at 293.
Mr. Gorham spoke these words on September 12, 1787. They were originally re-
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jury: Or if there is any difference between them it consists in this; the
the latter represent
former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty,
113
it as the very palladium of free government.
He then proceeded, however, in terms strikingly similar to those later
used by Justice Cardozo in Palko1 4 to set forth the Federalist view that
there is no "inseparable connexion between the existence of liberty and
the trial by jury in civil cases." 11 5 Employing an attenuated analysis, he
argued that the civil jury's only special value was as a hedge against judicial corruption. While this analysis ensured some respect for juries, it
was not a blanket justification for their employment. Hamilton argued
that juries were inappropriate in cases involving international relations,
like those concerning prizes seized on the high seas, and in cases assigned
to equity in which the problems were too "nice and intricate" for common folk. 1 6 He emphasized the benefits of leaving the issue of the right
to jury trial to the legislature and intimated that the jury's role could be
safely reduced in democratic post-revolutionary America.
Hamilton's arguments in The FederalistNumber 83 could not have
been particularly comforting to jury proponents. He sought to place the
right to jury trial under the absolute control of the federal legislature and
saw juries as nothing but a restraint on judicial venality. The Antifederalist response to these ideas was emphatically negative. In fact, the Antifederalists treated the absence of a civil jury guarantee as warranting the
rejection of the Constitution in its entirety. In responding to Hamilton
and other jury critics, they stressed three points: First, the jury was the
best mechanism to thwart application of unwise laws enacted by an insensitive national legislature; second, it provided a method of protecting
debtors from the inflexible rules that regulated commerce; and third, it
provided a means of checking corrupt or overactive judges. 17 All of the
Antifederalists' arguments centered on their belief that the courts should
not become the exclusive province of the judges.
The Antifederalists frequently cited with approval Blackstone's famous statement:
The impartial administration of justice, which secures both our
persons and our properties, is the great end of civil society. But if that
be entirely entrusted to the magistracy, a select body of men, and those
generally selected by the prince or such as enjoy the highest offices in
113.
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the state, their decisions, in spite of their own natural integrity, will
have frequently an involuntary bias towards those of their own rank
and dignity; it is not to be expected from human nature that the few
1 i5
should be always attentive to the interests and good of the many.
It was critical to the Antifederalists that the jury serve the interests of
democracy by injecting the values of the "many" into judicial proceedings. They refused to accept an unconstrained federal judiciary in which
judges were free to act like England's Lord Mansfield, whose "habit of
controling juries does not accord with the free institutions of this
country."' 19
Because of the Antifederalist agitation, at least seven of the states
ratifying the Constitution called for immediate amendment to secure the
right to jury trial in civil cases. While the Antifederalists failed in their
campaign to prevent the Constitution from being adopted, they were the
"generative force behind the seventh amendment [and] their arguments
should be given due weight in determining the purpose behind [it]." 120
It proved less difficult to draft the text of the amendment than Hamilton had supposed. In order to encompass the great range of jury prac12 1
tice in America, the drafters couched the amendment in broad terms.
These terms were in accord with earlier Antifederalist arguments that
had rejected contentions about drafting difficulties by stressing the utility
of "reference... to the common law of England, which obtains through
12 2
every State."
The triumph of the jury right was reflected not only in the Seventh
Amendment but also in the Judiciary Act of 1789. That Act held equity
tightly in check and emphasized remedies at law with their concomitant
jury trial. This emphasis is not surprising given the fact that the Act was
being drafted at precisely the same moment the Seventh Amendment was
12 3
making its way through Congress.
Jury developments did not cease with the adoption of the Seventh
Amendment. The jury, which had served as a symbol of democracy and
restraint on judicial power in the Antifederalist campaign against the
Constitution, took on a somewhat different role in American society between 1790 and 1810. It became an instrument of compromise that tem118.
119.
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pered both the ardent Federalist desire for a strong judiciary and the
Republican radicals' thirst for a simplified law without courtrooms or
lawyers. Events in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and on the national
level all illustrate these trends.
In 1800, Alexander Addison, a strong-willed Federalist Pennsylvania state court judge, did not allow one of his fellow judges, a Republican, to address a grand jury to which Addison had made a speech
124
concerning the merits of the recent election of a Republican governor.
This ban, and another like it several months later, provoked the Pennsylvania Legislature to impeach Addison. At his subsequent trial before
the State Senate, Addison, who maintained his "insolent, arrogant and
overbearing conduct," 125 was convicted and removed from office.
Addison was the archetypal overzealously political judge, ever ready
to interfere with and seek control over the jury. His removal signaled the
acceptance of a widely held belief that such conduct was unacceptable
and that excessive interference with the jury, especially when couched in
political terms, would not be tolerated. Addison's removal opened up
the possibility of a partisan review of the performance of all sitting
judges. Pennsylvania's Republican legislators flirted with the idea of a
political purge before eventually rejecting it. Instead, they appeared to
accept a compromise that left judicial independence intact so long as the
judges respected the jury and refrained from pursuing overtly political

objectives.
Pennsylvania's jury system came under attack not only from highhanded Federalist judges but also from Republican radicals. The radicals sought to remove as many disputes as possible from traditional
courts, to make drastic modifications in courtroom procedure, and to
utilize arbitration whenever possible. Their espoused goal was to free the
people from lawyers and law courts. The radicals' proposed program
became an important issue in the hard-fought 1805 election that pitted
them against more moderate Republicans. 126 The moderates' victory
preserved the traditional adjudicatory system with its emphasis on an
independent judiciary working in tandem with a jury. In both this political contest and the Addison affair, the jury was seen not as a panacea
but as a compromise that insured the preservation of the status quo.
During this same era, a dispute regarding the power of the jury
arose in Massachusetts. The conflict focused particularly on whether the
124. See
125.
126.
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jury had the right to decide questions of law as well as fact. 127 Massachusetts juries had traditionally been free to disregard judicial instructions concerning the law and to return general verdicts that conflicted
with established doctrine. Federalists were deeply troubled by this practice and, as part of a larger reform package, sought to curtail the jury's
power as a law finder. In 1803 Supreme Court Justice Theodore
Sedgwick solidified Federalist reform objectives when he called for the
adoption of a judicial circuit riding mechanism very similar to the English nisi prius system, a limitation on appeals, and a suspension of the
practice of permitting juries to interpret the law. As to the last point
Sedgwick argued:
In all instances where trial by jury has been practiced, and a separation of the law from the fact has taken place, there have been expedition, certainty, system and their consequences, general approbation.
Where this has not been the case, neither expedition, certainty nor sys128
tem have prevailed.

The legislature quickly enacted the nisi prius mechanism and other
reforms perceived as technical, but Federalists and Republicans came
into sharp conflict over proposed limitations on the jury's power to interpret the law. 129 The Republicans were loath to curtail jury power or
cede additional authority to an already formidable judiciary. They countered the Federalist demands by calling for the expansion of the jury's
authority to question witnesses and by pushing for the adoption of a rule
barring appellate review of jury decisions. The latter proposal was
viewed by some as a challenge to the maintenance of any fixed law. Massachusetts moderates eventually resolved this dispute by reaffirming the
independence of the judiciary and by insisting on the use of juries vested
with the sort of powers they had previously held.
This pattern of conflict and compromise was acted out even more
dramatically on the federal level. Jefferson's election in 1800 sent shock
waves through the Federalist establishment. Seeking to secure their
power in the overwhelmingly Federalist judicial branch, the lame duck
Federalist Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1801130 and several

pieces of related legislation. These acts were intensely partisan, creating
posts designed to be filled hurriedly by the outgoing Federalist administration. They also altered a variety of procedural and jurisdictional requirements in ways advantageous to Federalist constituencies.
127.
128.
129.
130.

See id. at 184-229.
Id. at 190.
Id. at 191-206.
Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, 2 Stat. 89 (repealed 1802).
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The Jeffersonian Republicans perceived the Federalists' actions as a
serious challenge. Eventually, President Jefferson pursued the constitutionally questionable course of repealing the legislation. His decision not
to deliver outstanding commissions to those in line for appointment
under the Federalists' enactments provoked the famous constitutional
challenge confronted by the Court in Marbury v. Madison.13 1 In Marbury, Chief Justice Marshall fashioned an opinion that emphasized judicial authority to review the constitutionality of legislation. He yielded to
the Republicans, however, on the specific question of Marbury's commission and thereby averted a direct confrontation between the judiciary and
the executive. 13 2 By avoiding a constitutional confrontation, the two
sides seemed to strike a bargain. The Republicans appeared to be willing
to recognize the judiciary's independence and power if the judges would
agree to refrain from using their judicial positions to pursue clearly parti133
san political objectives.
This modus vivendi seemed to unravel when John Pickering, a mentally unbalanced federal judge from New Hampshire, was impeached and
removed from office. Pickering was ousted after a heated Senate debate
that focused on whether mental incompetence amounted to one of the
"high Crimes and Misdemeanors" denominated as the only legitimate
grounds for removal by Article II, section 4 of the Constitution. 134 In
Pickering's case, a majority of senators eventually took a broad view of
the impeachment power.
Partly on the strength of this expansive interpretation, Congress
turned its attention almost immediately to another Federalist judge,
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase. The gravamen of the charge
against Chase was that he had conducted himself in a partisan fashion.
All seven articles of impeachment focused upon his alleged bias. One
article addressed his delivery of an inappropriately political charge to a
grand jury in Baltimore. The other six focused on his conduct in both
the treason trial of John Fries and the seditious libel trial of James
Callender.
In the Fries case, 13 5 Chase was accused of stifling the defense counsel by issuing a preemptive legal opinion that prevented counsel from
131.
132.
133.
134.

5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803).
ELLIS, supra note 124, at 64-66.
Id. at 69.
Id. at 69-75.

135.

PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 14, at 108-18. My analy-

sis of Chase's impeachment draws extensively upon the outstanding work of Professor Presser.
It should be noted that by contemporary standards, Fries's trial may not have been the travesty it seems when viewed in late twentieth century terms. Sanderson reported that at the
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arguing certain questions of law to the jury. Chase's opinion cut off the
only viable avenue of defense and led counsel to withdraw from the proceedings in protest. Chase then announced that he would act as the defendant's counsel. Despite this commitment, Chase's closing remarks
were strongly biased in favor of the prosecution. 3 6 In addition, he reminded the jury that Fries had been previously tried and convicted (even
though the earlier conviction had been reversed on appeal). Fries was
convicted of treason and sentenced to death.
Chase's involvement with the seditious libel case against James Callender, a scurrilous journalist, was similar to his role in the Fries case.
Callender's main objective at trial was to challenge the constitutionality
of the Sedition Act under which he was charged. 1 37 Chase preemptively
intervened, however, barring counsel from both presenting certain evidence and arguing the law to the jury. Counsel once again chose to resign rather than comply with Chase's ruling. After an abbreviated trial,
Callender was convicted.
Chase's real offense in both Fries and Callenderwas having invaded
the province of the jury, most particularly by removing certain legal issues from their purview. 38 In acting as he did, he also opened himself to
charges of judicial oppression. The Jeffersonians likened him to George
Jeffreys, the worst of the Stuart judges, and accused him of having trespassed on territory set aside for the jury in such celebrated cases as
Zenger and Seven Bishops.139 Even though Chase was eventually acquitted by the Senate, his impeachment trial underscored the jury's continuing importance as adjudicator of law as well as fact.
The observations of Alexis de Tocqueville, an observer of American
society in the early 1830s, are useful in understanding the role of the jury
in his time. In Democracy in America, de Tocqueville concluded that the
American jury was a fundamentally "political institution" 14 0 the primary
function of which was to place political power in the hands of the governed. According to de Tocqueville, the jury also served as the "gratuitous public school"'' 4 that taught citizens how to take charge of society's
close of proceedings, Fries thanked Justice Chase for the way he conducted the trial. Stephen
Presser, Et tu, Raul? or the Original MisunderstandingMisunderstood, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV.
1475, 1482 & n.31.
136. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 14, at 113-14.
137. Id. at 136-37.
138. See id. at 18.
139. Id. at 13-14.
140. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, 1 DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 281 (Alfred A. Knopf, 15th
ed. 1985) (1830).
141. Id. at 285.
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affairs. Putting his finger on the essence of the Jeffersonian compromise,
he concluded that "in no country are the judges so powerful as where the
people share their privileges." 142
The high drama of the Jeffersonian period gave way to more prosaic
and materialistic times in which the jury's function was significantly altered. Historians have concluded that merchants', bankers', and industrialists' demands for a more predictable, and perhaps sympathetic,
system led to the curtailment of the jury's power, especially with respect
to the determination of law. 143 The next two sections of this Article will
explore the nature of some of the alterations made in the jury's operations and some of the limitations on the curtailment hypothesis. What
follows will not be a systematic tracing of the history of the jury over the
last 150 years, but rather an examination of several critical moments in
that history-moments that reveal both change and continuity.
HI. The Jury as Anchor in a Sea of Shifting Doctrine: Tort
Law in the Nineteenth Century
Courts wanted to control juries during the last century, they want to
control them today, and they will probably want to control them in the
they
future. If we take away contributory negligence from the judges,
144
will find some other way. It's hard to beat judicial ingenuity.
The nineteenth century has been described as the era of the greatest
judicial ingenuity. Morton Horwitz, 145 William Nelson, 146 and other
outstanding legal historians have contended that throughout the century,
judges labored to reformulate doctrines in areas such as tort law to better
serve the needs of the business elite in a rapidly industrializing society.
These historians have argued that as part of this reformist effort, judges
were inclined to take ever more forceful steps to control juries. This description of nineteenth century developments does not, however, encompass the entire story. First, there was appreciable resistance to the "new"
tort law, and juries continued to interject notions of common decency
and fairness into the cases they heard. Second, shortly after the century's
end, the backlash against one-sided and harsh, judicially-created tort
doctrines resulted in a renewed reliance on the jury to humanize the law,
a trend that has continued to the present.
142. Id. at 286.
143. See, eg., HoRwrrz, supra note 119, at 140-41; NELSON, supra note 15, at 8.
144. Malone, supra note 16, at 182.
145. HoRwrrz, supra note 119.
146.

NELSON, supra note 15.
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The doctrine of contributory negligence was foremost among the
substantive tort principles created by the nineteenth century judiciary to
control the jury. This rule, in its most rigorous form, requires that a
plaintiff be denied all recovery if she is found to have contributed, even in
the slightest degree, to her injury. 147 The doctrine of contributory negligence was treated as neither new nor special when it made its first appearance in the 1809 English case of Butterfield v. Forrester.148 The fact
that its originality was thus overlooked is something of a mystery. It has
been suggested that the court had no intention of creating a new, broadranging doctrine, but was simply reiterating traditional, perhaps even
medieval, notions about liability in cases involving a sequence of wrongful acts.' 49 Be that as it may, over the course of the 1800s the doctrine
grew into the foremost barrier to recovery in tort cases. Professor Lawrence Friedman found that the defense was used in about half of all railroad cases-the most important category of tort cases-litigated in
Alameda County, California, between 1880 and 1900.150
Contributory negligence served as an effective barrier in tort cases
because it shifted the focus of judicial attention from the defendant's liability to the plaintiff's conduct. It required that compensation be denied
if the plaintiff could not prove that certain self-protective measures were
taken (such as stopping, looking, and listening before crossing a railroad
track). If the plaintiff could not provide such proof, the judge could dismiss the case as a matter of law, without ever submitting the matter to
the jury. 15 1 Alternatively, the judge could sharply narrow the jury's deliberations by giving strict judicial instructions concerning the plaintiff's
52
failure of proof.1
In 1946 Professor Wex Malone wrote what has generally been
treated as the definitive history of the rise of the contributory negligence
principle in America. 153 He focused his study on the growth of the doctrine in New York state, one of the nation's early industrial leaders. New
York first applied the doctrine in 1829, but it grew slowly, appearing in
only four appellate decisions in twenty years. 154 In the period between
147. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 65,
at 451-53 (5th ed. 1984).
148. 103 Eng. Rep. 926, 927 (K.B. 1809).
149. See Fleming James, Jr., Last Clear Chance: A TransitionalDoctrine, 47 YALE L.J.
704, 704-05 (1938).
150. Lawrence M. Friedman, Civil Wrongs: PersonalInjury Law in the Late 19th Century,
1987 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 351, 367.
151.

Malone, supra note 16, at 164-65.

152.
153.
154.

Id. at 167-69.
Id.
Id. at 153.
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1850 and 1860, however, contributory negligence was relied upon in a
dozen decisions, nine after 1855.155 The doctrine's use tripled in the next
decade and doubled in the decade after that. Malone argued that the
dramatic upsurge in the use of contributory negligence was attributable
to "a seething, although somewhat covert, dissatisfaction over the part
[judges and lawyers] felt the jury was destined to play in... cases against
15 6
corporate defendants."
The judiciary came to believe that the jury was incapable of comprehending the new industrial reality. Judges also assumed that jurors were
irremediably biased against corporate defendants. Based on these assumptions, judges sought to curtail the jury's authority. The courts'
analysis was neatly summarized by Judge Barculo in Haring v. New York
1 57
and Erie Railroad:
We can not shut our eyes to the fact that in certain controversies
between the weak and the strong-between a humble individual and a
gigantic corporation, the sympathies of the human mind naturally,
honestly and generously, run to the assistance and support of the feeble, and apparently oppressed; and that compassion will sometimes exercise over the deliberations of a jury, an influence which, however
honorable to them as philanthropists, is wholly inconsistent with the
principles of law and the ends of justice. There, [sic] is therefore, a
manifest propriety in withdrawing from the consideration of the jury,
those cases in which the plaintiff fails to show a right of recovery.15
Juries came to be viewed as "mere assistants of the courts, whose
province it is to aid them in the decision of disputed questions of fact." 5 9
Declarations such as these were utilized to justify confining the jury to a
subordinate place in the litigation process. Courts applied the doctrine of
contributory negligence to enforce this subordination by converting a series of critical questions about the plaintiff's conduct into issues of law to
be determined exclusively by the judge. Thus empowered, the judge
could steer the case as he believed the needs of society demanded.
Had this been the end of the matter, Professor Malone's argument
in favor of recognizing and yielding to judicial "ingenuity" would have
been overwhelming1 60 and the jury would have been well on its way to
disappearing from tort cases. There were, however, substantial weaknesses in the underpinnings of the contributory negligence doctrine.
155. Id. at 155.
156. L.
157. 13 Barb. 2 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1852).
158. Id. at 15-16.
159. Ernst v. Hudson River R.R., 24 How. Pr. 97, 105 (N.Y. 1862), quoted in Malone,
supra note 16, at 158-59.
160. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
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Most importantly, the rule was premised on the notion that jurors are
foolish laymen incapable of exercising judgment in tort cases. The available evidence suggested otherwise. In his empirical examination of actual jury decisions in Alameda County, Professor Friedman found that
while jurors tended to favor plaintiffs, they did not do so "crudely or
inevitably." 16 1 They appeared to exercise careful and discriminating
judgment. This information, assuredly similar to that to be observed in
New York's courts, must have weakened the New York judges' arguments against the jury.
Classical contributory negligence doctrine had other serious flaws as
well. Application of the doctrine provided virtually no incentive for improvements in safety. A good example of this phenomenon occurred in
the railroad industry in the late nineteenth century. Although efficient
railway air brakes were invented in 1868, they were not adopted by the
railway industry until legislation was passed compelling installation in
the mid-1880s. 162 Adoption was likely delayed because contributory
negligence and other restrictive tort doctrines allowed railways to avoid
liability despite reliance on shoddy equipment.
Contributory negligence was also troublesome because it granted the
court an extremely broad power "to accept or reject jury participation at
its pleasure." 163 However, a court's unbridled discretion was potentially
as lawless and unpredictable as a jury's. In an effort to curb this discretion, at least in the railroad cases that made up the bulk of tort actions,
courts developed certain geography-based rules. These rules rejected
railroad liability in rural settings where there appeared to be a clear view
of trains approaching intersections, but allowed cases to go to the jury in
urban environments. 164 The intellectual poverty of this mechanical approach to adjudication is obvious.
Perhaps the most troubling feature of contributory negligence was
the way it dehumanized the law by excluding the jury's real-world concerns from the adjudicatory process. Nineteenth century tort doctrine
became an inflexible set of rules that ignored such issues as powerlessness, sympathy, fear of corporate oppression, and compassion in order
that judges might pursue the allegedly majestic "principles of law." 165
John Noonan has exposed the terrible human toll these judicial con161.
162.
163.
164.
165.

Friedman, supra note 150, at 375.
Malone, supra note 16, at 161.
Id. at 169.
Id. at 170-72.
See supra text accompanying note 158.
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structs-these "masks"-can take. 166 Such masks invite judges to ignore
human considerations and the potential harmfulness of legal doctrines in
167
favor of an abstract and often insidious set of principles.
Visions of judicial ingenuity's triumph through the doctrine of contributory negligence, such as Professor Malone's, are flawed not only because the doctrine produces results of such dubious quality, but also
because those visions miss the most important chapter of the story. Contributory negligence was not society's last word on torts. The doctrine
fell into progressively greater disfavor until the jury eventually reemerged as a full participant in the tort process-indeed, the jury may
never have been banished to the degree Malone suggests. In states other
than New York, including New Hampshire and California, there is evidence that contributory negligence was a relatively disfavored doctrine in
the late nineteenth century and that its invocation did not regularly re168
sult in eliminating the jury from the process.
Even assuming that contributory negligence was victorious, by the
early 1900s its hold on the law had begun to crumble. In 1901, Seymour
Thompson's Commentaries on the Law of Negligence labeled contributory negligence as "cruel and wicked." 169 Thompson declared that contributory negligence "shocks the ordinary sense of justice of
mankind." 170 The law began to move away from the doctrine in 1908
when Congress enacted the Federal Employers Liability Act1 71 (FELA),
which barred reliance on contributory negligence in most cases involving
railway workers. FELA utilized the jury and premised recovery on comparative negligence, thereby facilitating partial recovery even when workers had contributed to their injuries. In 1910, Mississippi became the
first state to shift all its personal injury actions to a comparative negligence basis.1 72 The comparative negligence doctrine grew slowly but
JOHN T. NOONAN, PERSONS AND MASKS OF THE LAW 19 (1976).
167. See id. at 19-28.
168. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century
America: A Reinterpretation,90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1744-45, 1751-52 (1981) (suggesting that the
New Hampshire Supreme Court appraised collisions in a way that gave victims a presumptive
excuse, and the California Supreme Court required only "ordinary care" from pedestrians hit
by street cars).
169. SEYMOUR THOMPSON, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NEGLIGENCE 168-69
(1901), quoted in Friedman, supra note 150, at 356.
170. Friedman, supra note 150, at 365-67.
171. Federal Employers Liability Act, Ch. 149, 35 Stat. 66 (1908) (codified as amended at
45 U.S.C. § 53 (1988)).
166.

172.
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steadily until the 1970s when its popularity soared. As of 1982, more
73
than 40 states had adopted some form of comparative negligence rule. 1
The shift to comparative negligence was accompanied by a growing
reliance on jurors to ameliorate the consequences of harsh tort doctrines.
When judges tired of their ill-conceived principles, they turned to the
jury for relief. They permitted jurors, sub silentio, to whittle away at the
contribution rule. Writing in 1938 about an offshoot of the contributory
negligence doctrine, Fleming James, Jr. concluded: "The real solution
for the present lies in the jury and in the approval of simpler and vaguer
formulas in instructions to the jury."'174 Trial judges occasionally acknowledged their reliance on this strategy. In 1952, Judge Charles
Wyzanski, Jr. of the Boston Federal District Court candidly declared
that "juries are the device by which the rigor of the law is modified pending the enactment of new statutes."' 175 According to Judge Wyzanski,
judges could not do the job themselves because their hands were tied by
176
outmoded but still binding legal rules.
These developments restored the jury to prominence. Ironically, the
jury may have regained center stage in the tort process because of contributory negligence. Judicial hegemony produced contributory negligence, a harsh and dubious doctrine. That experience seems to have
taught the courts a lesson concerning the limits of judicial wisdom and
the value of citizen participation.

IV.

The Jury and the Rhetoric of Efficiency

It is the delay, the uncertainty, the expense, the inability to reach results, which has put the jury system out of touch with an age of intense
material activity .... 177
As judges began to retreat from the doctrine of contributory negligence, thus restoring the jury's more prominent role in tort cases, another challenge to the jury's operations was gaining prominence. This
critique focused on the inefficiency the jury introduced into the legal system. One of the first twentieth century critics to sound this theme was
Alfred Coxe. In a 1901 article in the first volume of the Columbia Law
173. Id. At least four more states-South Carolina, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Ohiohave adopted comparative negligence since 1982. See Nelson v. Concrete Supply Co., 399 S.E.
2d 783 (S.C. 1991); Elder v. Orluck, 515 A. 2d 517 (Pa. 1986); Hilen v. Hayes, 673 S.W. 2d
713 (Ky. 1984); Wolfong v. Batdorf, 451 N.E. 2d 1185 (Ohio 1983).
174. James, supra note 149, at 723.
175. Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., A Trial Judge's Freedom and Responsibility, 65 HARV. L.
REV. 1281, 1286 (1952).

176. See id. at 1285.
177.

Alfred C. Coxe, The Trials of Jury Trials, 1 COLUM. L. REv. 286, 289 (1901).
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Review, 178 he challenged the jury, most particularly in civil cases, as an
inefficient mechanism in need of substantial overhaul. 179 While Coxe acknowledged the ability of the jury to resolve many factual questions, he
believed it was incapable of addressing truly complex matters. 8 0 He
pointed to the unanimous decision rule as a substantial deterrent to effective adjudication' 8" and stressed the need to improve the quality of the
venire. 1 2 Coxe's argument is striking not only because of the contemporary sound of his complaints, but also because both his criticisms and
proposed solutions lacked any empirical grounding. He assumed that
the jury's flaws, as well as appropriate reforms, were self-evident. Apparently, he viewed rhetoric as ample justification for change.
The rhetoric of efficiency grew in popularity over the succeeding
thirty years. A brief survey of the Index to Legal PeriodicalLiterature
indicates that the number of efficiency-concerned, jury-critical articles
grew from approximately 16 between 1899 and 1906 to approximately 39
between 1924 and 1932.183 One of the leading critics of this era was
Professor Edson Sunderland of the University of Michigan Law
School.18 4 In 1915 he wrote a seminal article entitled The Inefficiency of
the American Jury,' 8 5 in which he argued that judges should be granted
extensive powers to comment upon the quality and implications of the
evidence in their closing remarks. This approach, relied upon in English
practice, had been sharply curtailed in America on the theory that it
86
allowed excessive judicial intrusion into the jury's province.1
Sunderland contended that judicial commentary could substantially
improve efficiency by reducing the time needed to select jurors and pres178. Id.
179. Id. at 290-91.
180. Id. at 291.
181. Id. at 292, 294.
182. Id. at 296-97.
183. From 1899 to 1906, there were 96 articles in the Index section entitled "Jury." Of
these, 66 were neutral, inapposite, or unavailable. From 1924 to 1932, there were 184 articles
in the appropriate section. Of these, 128 were neutral, inapposite, or unavailable. Because
some of the relevant data were unavailable, the number of efficiency-concerned jury-critical
articles in each period may be greater than the number reported in the text. In light of the
total number of articles written in each period, however, it does not seem likely that the ratio
would change dramatically.
184. Professor Sunderland would eventually play a critical part in drafting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
FederalRules of Civil Procedurein HistoricalPerspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909, 967 & n.342
(1987).
185. Edson R. Sunderland, The Inefficiency of the American Jury, 13 MIcH. L. REv. 302
(1915).
186. Id at 305.
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ent the evidence, as well as affording the court an opportunity to correct
errors that might otherwise lead to appeals and new trials. 187 The judge,
through his wise counsel, would properly guide all but the most recalcitrant jurors. While some argued that this approach might rob the jury of
its independence, Sunderland replied that the jury remained free at all
times to decide as it felt proper and that it could never be forced into a
decision against its will. 188 The inconsistency between these two propositions was either ignored or not recognized. Sunderland made no effort to
produce any empirical evidence to demonstrate how judicial commentary
would work. In response to the objection that judicial commentary is
inconsistent with the jury's political role as a check on the judiciary, Sunderland adopted a narrow functionalist strategy claiming: first, that in a
democracy the jury has little political significance; and second, that the
jury's only real job is to properly resolve questions of fact. Sunderland's
approach is strikingly similar to that adopted sixty years later by Justice
189
White in Colgrove v. Battin.
Sunderland revisited the jury issue on several occasions over the
next ten years. In 1920 he campaigned for the use of special verdicts,
which he presented as a means of curtailing jury authority by requiring
jurors to detail the basis for their decisions. 190 In 1926 he returned to the
inefficiency theme when he repeated his article from eleven years earlier
virtually verbatim. 19 1 Interestingly, in a new section of this article, he
attacked various rules of evidence and called for empirical data to justify
192
regulations that he felt were premised "upon the merest speculation."'
Unfortunately, he did not require the same kind of proof to support his
criticism of the jury or his assertions about the benefits of judicial com193
mentary on the evidence.
Sunderland's articulation of a selective empirical concern should not
come as a complete surprise. In certain legal circles in the 1920s, there
was a decided shift away from a rhetorical and formalist 194 approach to
187. Id. at 310-12.
188. Id. at 309-10.
189. See supra note 1.
190. Edson R. Sunderland, Verdicts, General and Special, 29 YALE L.J. 253, 259-60
(1920).
191. See Edson R. Sunderland, The Problem of Trying Issues, 5 TEX. L. REV. 18 (1926).
192. Id. at 22 (referring specifically to the statute of frauds).
193. Sunderland eventually gathered data on jury operations and reported them in a
speech he gave in 1937. Edson R. Sunderland, Trial by Jury, 11 U. CIN. L. REV. 119, 120-30

(1937).
194. Wallace Loh has provided a fine brief definition of formalism. He says formalism
"conceived of law as a closed, deductive body of logically ordered rules." WALLACE D. LOH,
SOCIAL RESEARCH IN THE JUDICIAL PROCEss

612 (1984).
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the law. The legal realist movement was taking hold, perhaps inspired by
the writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes who declared: "The life of the
law has not been logic; it has been experience." 195 The realists wanted to
study the law in operation and reform inefficient aspects of it. As several
prominent realists explained: "The reformers have failed [in the past]
because the necessary basic research was lacking ....We regard facts as
196
the prerequisites for reform."
Empirical work was begun on a number of topics. One of the centers of this activity was Yale Law School, where Charles E. Clark was a
faculty member. 19 7 Clark was no friend of the jury. In a 1923 article he
opined:
Jurists of experience find little to say in support of the delays, the
expense, and the aleatory results of trial by jury. In England it is being
more and more restricted. Its real advantage seems to be as a kind of
safety valve for the judicial system. It relieves the judges of the burden
and the odium of deciding close questions of fact in cases, such as personal injury actions, where the feelings of litigants are apt to run
high. 198
In 1927 Clark and a number of his Yale colleagues began an examination
of cases filed in the New Haven Superior Court. Their objective was "to
substitute for the vague generalizations of the older economists and philosophers concrete information based on adequate statistical information," 199 and to use these data as a springboard for reform.
By 1934 Clark and co-author Harry Shulman had amassed a
database of more than 23,000 cases brought between 1919 and 1932. On
the strength of this data base they attempted to survey the worth of the
jury in an article entitled Jury Trial in Civil Cases-A Study in Judicial
Administration.2°° They argued that their findings provided empirical
justification for criticisms of jury efficiency. They found that juries were
used in only four percent of civil cases while consuming as much as fortyfour percent of trial time, 20 1 that the vast preponderance of jury cases
195.

OLIVER W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1898).

196. John H. Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the
Yale Experience, 28 BuFF. L. REV. 459, 468 (1979) (quoting A Program of Research in the
Administration of the Law, App. A at I (n.d. Summer 1926) (Hutchins papers)).
197. Clark would eventually be the primary architect of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Subrin, supra note 184, at 961-75.
198. Charles E. Clark, Union of Law and Equity and Trial by Jury Under the Codes, 32
YALE L.J. 707, 711 (1923) (footnotes omitted).
199. Charles E. Clark, FactResearch in Law Administration, 1 MISS. L.J. 324, 324 (1929).
200. Charles E. Clark & Harry Shulman, Jury Trial in Civil Cases-A Study in Judicial
Administration, 43 YALE L.J. 867, 869 (1934).
201. Id. at 882.
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clustered in the negligence area, 20 2 and that, because of the need for alternates and the discarding of potential jurors through voir dire, jury
trial consumed the time of substantially more than twelve jurors, all leading to higher costs for the state. 20 3 On the basis of these findings, they
concluded:
Whatever the political, psychological or jurisprudential values of the
jury as an institution may be, its use in the civil litigation covered by
this study is certainly not impressive. The picture seems to be that of
an expensive, cumbersome and comparatively inefficient trial device
employed in cases where exploitation of the situation is made possible
by underlying rules. Persuasive reasons are found in the facts set forth
for the definite limitation of the right of jury trial to the role of safety
valve; and for the greater use of the summary judgment in the debt
cases, the requirement of substantial jury trial fees, and the reduction
2° 4
in the number of jurors required for a petit jury to nine or even six.
These arguments seem less than convincing. The data are not
tightly focused on jury operations. Many of the statistically-based insights are modest and the authors failed to consider the jury's role as
either trend-setter or political mechanism. Indeed, Clark and Shulman
stacked the debate by adopting a reductionist strategy that failed to consider the great variety of functions that the jury served. They also neglected to determine whether their data were typical of the broader
American scene. In fact, in 1930, Professor Silas Harris of Ohio State
Law School had indicated that the Connecticut data were seriously
skewed because juries there were atypically anti-plaintiff in their orientation. 20 5 An idiosyncratic 1854 jury selection law compelled the choice of
a superabundance of conservative rural jurors. This, in turn, discouraged
plaintiffs from opting for the jury with the same frequency noted in other
jurisdictions. This information underscored the need for a broader research effort that looked beyond raw court statistics and focused on more
than a single locale. Unfortunately, by the middle 1930s the realist
movement's empirical efforts were beginning to falter. The failure of the
research to yield substantial support for reform combined with its considerable expense put a damper on further inquiry. 20 6
Large scale jury research resumed in the 1950s when Hans Zeisel,
Harry Kalven, and the University of Chicago Jury Project turned their
attention to the subject. 20 7 The Project focused on particular localities,
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

Id. at 870.
Id. at 876.
Id. at 884 (footnote omitted).
See Silas A. Harris, Is the Jury Vanishing?, 7 N.Y.U. L. REV. 657, 667 (1930).
Schlegel, supra note 196, at 572-75.
KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 17, at 33-54.
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like Manhattan's congested courts, and the nation at large by means of a
series of samples. The samples consisted of both juror and judge case
assessments that were analyzed to provide information about the jury's
internal workings and reliability. Given the historical context of the research, it is not surprising that the first book-length monograph focused
on the question of delay. 20 8 Zeisel and his colleagues found that jury
trials were approximately forty percent slower than bench trials.209
Zeisel also concluded, however, that the jury system's total cost was not
great and was more than justified by the values it introduced into the
process. 210 According to Zeisel, the delay problem was best addressed by
21 1
means of a series of case and trial management techniques.
In their research on the broader question of the efficacy of the jury,
Kalven and Zeisel's work disclosed some important facts. Perhaps key
was the finding that the judge and jury agree about trial outcome approximately 78 percent of the time.2 12 This level of agreement compares favorably with agreement among other decisionmakers in American
society, including diagnosing physicians and psychiatrists as well as
grant evaluators for the National Science Foundation.2 1 3 Kalven and
Zeisel conducted a range of sophisticated analyses that led them to conclude that the jury generally "follows the evidence and understands the
case."' 214 These findings and a number of others established a strong empirical defense of the jury system. Professor George Priest concluded in
1990:
Over the past quarter century... support for the civil jury has
become nearly unanimous. In large part, the overwhelming modem
belief in the importance of the civil jury can be attributed to the influential work of the University of Chicago Jury Project led by Harry
Kalven and Hans Zeisel. In its time, the Kalven-Zeisel Jury Project
was the most ambitious empirical study of jury decisionmaking that
had ever been attempted. As a result of their extensive empirical analysis, the authors claimed that the civil jury was a superior institution
for adjudicating disputes involving complex societal values, that the
jury served as an important instrument of popular control over law
enforcement, and that the jury brought a superior sense of social equity
to the decisionmaking process. Indeed, the authors interpreted their
208. See HANS

ZEISEL ET AL., DELAY IN THE COURT (1959).
209. Id. at 9.
210. Id.
211. Id.at 8-18.
212. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 17, at 55-65.
213. See, eg., Shari Seidman Diamond, Order in the Court: Consistency in Criminal-Court
Decisions, in 2 THE MASTER LECTURE SERIES: PSYCHOLOGY AND THE LAW 123 (Sheirer
and Hammonds eds., 1982).
214. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 17, at 149.
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empirical 1findings
to confirm simultaneously each of these
2 5
assertions.
While it is possible to question Priest's claim regarding the uncritical
reception of the jury in light of Colgrove and other Supreme Court decisions, Kalven and Zeisel did refocus the debate on empirical questions,
forcing policy makers to begin thinking about social science analysis.

V.

The Jury Redux

I confess that in my experience I have not found juries specially
inspired for the discovery of truth. I have not noticed that they could
see further into things or form a saner judgment than a sensible and
well trained judge. I have not found them freer from prejudice than an
ordinary judge would be. Indeed one reason why I believe in our practice of leaving questions of negligence to them is what is precisely one
of their gravest defects from the point of view of their theoretical function: that they will introduce into their verdict a certain amount-a
very large amount, so far as I have observed--of popular prejudice,
and thus keep the administration of the law in accord with the wishes
and feelings of the community. Possibly such a justification is a little
like that which an eminent English barrister gave me many years ago
for the distinction between barristers and solicitors. It was in substance that if law was to be practised somebody had to be damned, and
he preferred that it should be somebody else.216
Like Oliver Wendell Holmes's solicitors, the late twentieth century
jury stands in the unenviable position of being damned on a regular basis
because it must decide the most difficult questions before the courts. For
example, courts regularly ask juries to review the propriety of business
transactions of the most ambiguous or troubling sort. The Pennzoil Corporation turned to a jury, not a judge, when Texaco interfered with a
lucrative deal involving the Getty Oil Company.2 1 7 From the beginning,
the behavior of the principals in this affair was riddled with unsavory
practices, including bad faith bargaining, the destruction of evidence, and
apparent efforts to buy influence. 2 18 This mass of misstatements and
greed was eventually turned over to a group of twelve ordinary citizens
215. George L. Priest, The Role of the Civil Jury in a System of Private Litigation, 1990 U.
CH1. LEGAL F. 162 (1990).
216. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 443,
459-60 (1899).
217. Texaco, Inc. v. Penzoil Co., 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987), cert. dismissed,
485 U.S. 994 (1988), appeal dismissed on agreement of the parties, 748 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1988).
218. See generally THOMAS PETZINGER, JR., OIL AND HONOR: THE TEXACO-PENNZOIL
WARS (1987); Robert H. Mnookin & Robert B. Wilson, Rational Bargainingand Market Efficiency: UnderstandingPennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295 (1989).
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who rendered one of the largest, most widely discussed and sharply criticized verdicts in American history.2 19
The most striking feature of this case was the incredible power
vested in the jury and the abysmal failure of every other participant in
the process. The corporate players behaved in a shameless and reprehensible manner, the lawyers representing virtually every party showed
themselves at their pettifogging worst, and the judiciary was tainted by
the appearance of impropriety. The jury, whether it acted well or badly,
was society's last hope for correcting a transaction gone desperately
wrong. As Holmes put it, the jury was there if "somebody had to be
damned."
Judicial control of negligence litigation in the nineteenth century
provoked the expanded use of juries in twentieth century tort cases. 220
Modem juries have been called upon to decide the most difficult tort
questions, those affecting the lives and health of countless Americans. In
the absence of any other remedial mechanism, the victims of toxic torts
and product defects have turned to the jury. Jury decisions in these areas
have been far from ideal but, in the absence of any effective alternative,
the jury has at least responded.
Among the most interesting jury verdicts have been those involving
smokers and tobacco companies. 22 1 Juries have generally rejected smokers' claims, viewing the plaintiffs' voluntary actions as a barrier to recov-

ery. 222 The declaration of one juror in the recently concluded case of

Rose Cipollone powerfully dramatizes the difficulty that jurors face in
these cases. 2 23 After the conclusion of that case, the first in which any
award was made to a smoker, juror Ralph Eliseo plaintively asked,
"Why do I have to have the responsibility of deciding if a person was
responsible for smoking, was responsible for their own death? If Rosie
219. Mnookin & Wilson, supra note 218, at 296. The jury awarded $7.53 billion in compensatory damages and $3 billion in punitive damages.
220. In nine states for which figures are available, tort cases make up between 46% and
82% of all jury trials. See Marc Galanter, Are Civil Juries a Good Thing? 7 (May 26, 1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on fie with author).
221. For an excellent analysis of jury behavior in the tobacco cases, see Valerie P. Hans,
The Jury's Response to Business and Corporate Wrongdoing, 52 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS.

177, 198-201 (1989) (documenting the tensions and ambivalence prevalent in public reactions
toward holding corporations responsible for individual behavior).
222. Id. at 99 n.1 19 (citing David Gidmark, The Tobacco Juries-An In-Depth Study, 10
TRIAL DIPL. J. 18 (1987) (before 1988, tobacco companies won all the approximately 300
lawsuits brought against them)).
223. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., U.S. Dist. Ct. No. 83-2864 (D.N.J. 1988), afl'd in
partand rev'd in part, 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990) affd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S.Ct.
2608 (1992).
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knew she was smoking a bad product why didn't she stop? I didn't think
it was fair that she put this burden on me."' 224 Yet Mr. Eliseo and his
fellow jurors did shoulder this burden, as jurors have been doing for hundreds of years. When juries get the answer right very little is said. When
they get it wrong, or even when they make a "hard" decision, they are
likely to be criticized. Yet their behavior, especially in products liability
actions like the tobacco cases, suggests that they take a more thoughtful
and measured approach than is generally acknowledged.
Juries today have also been asked to rule on matters of the greatest
constitutional gravity. This is clearest in the criminal setting, in which
the Supreme Court has emphasized the value of having juries decide the
question of life or death in capital cases. But it is also true in the civil
setting. In defamation cases like that between Ariel Sharon, the Israeli
politician, and Time Magazine,225 juries have determined the appropriate
limits of the freedom of the press and the nature of the public's right to
be informed. They have generally handled such matters with great sensitivity. In the Sharon case, the jury harshly criticized Time, but recognized the strictness of the constitutional limitations on libel. 226 As in the
time of Peter Zenger, 227 the jury stood ready to sort out questions of libel
while respecting the principle of free expression.
Examples like Pennzoil, Cipollone, and Sharon establish very little
on their own. Equally, examples of the worst jury errors prove virtually
nothing. More than one hundred years ago, Forsyth cautioned against
arguments by anecdote. As he explained, "It would not be difficult for
an opponent of the system to cite ludicrous examples of foolish verdicts,
but they would be a very unfair sample of the average quality; and nothing can be more unsafe than to make exceptional cases the basis of legislation. ' ' 228 The cases mentioned in this section are the end product of a
long and complex history. An appreciation of that history requires
avoiding simplistic thinking about the jury. The jury is not a simple device. It has served, and still serves, as a political check on the judiciary,
an infuser of democratic principles into the adjudicatory process, a barrier to oppressive conduct, and a preserver of humanity and common
sense in decisionmaking. Whenever these jury functions are forgotten,
insightful analysis is undermined. History teaches us that the jury has
224. STEVEN BRILL ET AL., TRIAL BY JURY 416 (1989). The Cipollone verdict was reversed and the case remanded for retrial. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541
(3d Cir. 1990) aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 112 S.Ct. 2608 (1992).
225. Sharon v. Time, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 538 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
226. BRILL ET AL., supra note 224, at 132.
227. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
228. FORSYTH, supra note 30, at 376.
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been protean, repeatedly adapting to the needs of changing times. It was
William I's engine of inquisition, but it was also a bulwark of resistance
to James II. Recent history suggests that if we are really to understand
this changing organ of government we will have to pursue diligently the
empirical work Kalven and Zeisel began almost forty years ago. It is no
coincidence that when we engage in serious discussions about the jury
system, we turn to social scientists, as well as lawyers. The time for unsubstantiated rhetoric is long past. Careful analysis and thoughtful experiment are needed.
The civil jury is not invincible. Its disappearance in England over
the twenty years between the First World War and the Great Depression
provides proof, if any is needed, of its mortality. 229 If the American jury
is not to suffer the same fate, we must be sensitive to de Tocqueville's
observation:
The institution of the jury, if confined to criminal causes, is always
in danger; but when once it is introduced into civil proceedings, it defies the aggressions of time and man.... The jury, and more especially
the civil jury, serves to communicate the spirit of the judges to the
minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the habits which attend it,
is the soundest preparation for free institutions. It imbues all classes
with a respect for the thing judged and with the notion of right. If
these two elements be removed, the love of independence becomes a
mere destructive passion. It teaches men to practice equity; every man
learns to judge his neighbor as he would himself be judged. And this is
especially true of the jury in civil causes; for while the number of persons who have reason to apprehend a criminal prosecution is small,
everyone is liable to have a lawsuit.... It invests each citizen with a
kind of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which they are
bound to discharge towards society and the part which they take in its
government. By obliging men to turn their attention to other affairs
than their
own, it rubs off that private selfishness which is the rust of
23 °
society.
If we do not heed this advice we are likely to lose one of the most flexible
and democratic of our governing devices. We would be deprived of an
institution that has proven itself uniquely capable of adapting to the
needs of an ever changing America.

229. Devlin argues that the main reason for the jury's demise in English civil cases was
that both barristers and solicitors got out of the habit of jury practice during the hiatus imposed by World War I and its aftermath. DEVLIN, supra note 23, at 131-33.
230. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 140, at 284-85.

